1939 - Countdown to War

Our ever-increasing trend of celebrating or remembering great events through countless anniversaries naturally tends to concentrate on one particular date. The start of the Second World War on September 1 with Germany's invasion of Poland is somewhat of a misnomer, being that if we were to consider the whole global conflict, then it could be argued that Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was the first aggressive blow in a protracted battle, and that Poland's fight was extinguished within a month. Given that the two main participants in the European theatre were allied during the Polish War, one could argue that the Second World War did not begin truly until Germany sought to knock out France in May the following year.

Overy's book, released to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the conflict, concentrates on the 7 crucial days before War broke out. It's a short, punchy affair that is written without too much resort to diplomatic historical notes, and instead paraphrases the thoughts of those involved at the highest levels alongside memories of everyday folk seeing and hearing their respective countries fall inevitably into a fight. We're given invaluable insights, like Hitler's irritability and Von Ribbentrop's malevolent arrogance to the German ambassador Sir Neville Henderson's patience with his counterparts in Berlin. The 7 days are broken down into segments, and at times it's not a inevitable decline, as the period from 27th to 31st August raises hopes of a reprieve. There's a slight feeling of unreality during the whole period, and pertinently, up on hearing of the French and British declaration of war, in Berlin William Shirer wrote of "astonishment, depression on the faces of the population. There were no demonstrations, no throwing of flowers, no war fever." At the British Embassy he was shocked by the insouciance of the staff as "they talked about dogs and stuff".

From the outset, much is given to the intractable nature of Poland's existence, given that she was reborn by the Versailles Treaty, and against the inevitability of German aggression towards her. Yet until March 1939 when the battle lines were drawn, the reality was that the two countries had little to fight about, and Poland had been keen to take advantage of Germany's aggression towards the prone Czechoslovakia. Behind all this though was Hitler, whose dreams of Lebensraum ultimately drove his country to War.

Much of this book provides the notion that it might have been possible for the War to be averted. Hitler did not want to fight the English in particular. He harboured no real ill-feeling towards them, and respected their global empire. This was born out by the half-hearted attempt to invade in 1940 with the aborted "Operation SeaLion", but he also thought that they were in no real position to fight, and indeed it was only in 1938 that British rearmanent had begun to flicker into life. However, he had also lost considerable face at Munich, and was not prepared to do so again when involved in this latest round of diplomatic brinkmanship. Overy's skill in the book is to pinpoint the date of August 25th, when he outlines Hitler's hesitation, which has not been outlined before. The Wehrmacht was ready to march, but at the last moment was called back from the brink, and the order to invade Poland delayed. Grim and irritable, Hitler was beginning to sense that he could not break the firm commitment by the English to stay firm to their resolve in protecting Poland. By the time the War came, he did not want to face another humiliating comedown in front of his Army, and in many respects, went through with ordering a War, consciously aware that he was creating a nemesis he could not defeat.

Neville Chamberlain, whom history has treated somewhat badly, naturally had a major role as the British PM. It is easy, when placed alongside the Warlord Churchill, for him to be seen as a fey, flimsy character especially given his myopia during the Munich crisis a year later. However, Overy feels that it was his resolve, shaken considerably by what had happened in March when the Germans rolled into Prague, that stirred the British to remain on track to help the Polish, even though in reality, they could not in any militaristic sense. His speech on the 3rd of September still resonates with the sound of a man wracked with the sense of personal failure in not stopping War.

There has been much discussion that the British and French decision to help Poland exacerbated a local conflict into a global one, but there is also much to be said of the Polish determination not to give ground in any way during this period, and that if they had done so, then it is possible that German aggression might have petered out. At the centre of arguments of this nature is the personality of Hitler, whose experiences in the First World War had told him of the explosive potential of surprise. This was his greatest weapon, and in the Rhineland, the Anschluss of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and in May 1940 was used with devastating impact. But here, in 1939, Hitler did not have it, and being unable to break the Anglo-French alliance, was dragged into a fight with opponents that he did not want. It was the dictum of a "War now, rather than later" that drove him. What he did have this time was luck. The Molotov-Ribentropp pact sealed a Soviet willingness to do a deal over a broken Poland, and despite France's apparent readiness to go to war, neither France or Britain made an effort to pressurize Germany on its undefended Western front.

Ultimately, the Polish campaign defined Hitler's War. Poland's army was considerable, and whilst outdated, still had much to commend it. Yet within a month, the Wehrmacht had smashed their opponents with a fearsome combination of motorized tank warfare and airpower that became known as Blitzkreig. The Polish Army was ill-judged with its strategy, not taking note of one of the essential points of warfare that "by defending everything you defend nothing" and was never in a position to make a reasonable defence, even more so when the Soviets marched in two weeks later. The experience and confidence the Wehrmacht gained from this campaign gave them the impetus to conceive of a possible attack on their Western Front, which would knock the French out of the conflict, and put the British in a desparately difficult position.

"Countdown to War" expertly manages to encapsulate the whirlwind diplomacy that took place during this time, hinting at the false dawn of avoidance of War, but as Malcolm Muggeridge put it on September 3, 1939 " Like a swimmer tired of battling with a contrary current, abandoning the struggle, and letting himself be carried along by what he had long tried to resist, this last crisis was left to take its course", the feeling throughout is that Germany had long set in motion a juggernaut that could not be stopped.