D-Day - The Battle for Normandy

The battle for Normandy remains one of the grandest operations of the Second World War. By far the most definitive action of the Allies during the conflict, it encapsulates the direct approach favoured by the American command for their fight to liberate Europe against Nazi aggression. Anthony Beevor's book comes as the third of a triumvirate of books written by him describing some of the most important events of the War, after Stalingrad and Berlin.

Many tomes have been written about this particular battle, not least lengthy texts by noted military historians Max Hastins and John Keegan, and the noted achievements of the US 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions have been turned into celluloid history with the TV series Band of Brothers. Although it is often difficult to talk about this fight when compared to the truly gargantuan clash of armies that was occurring on the Eastern Front (Operation Bagration, which occurred at the same time as Operation Overlord, is now considered to be the most successful operation of the war, and was achieved with deception in the same way is still to be covered in any notable way by western historians), the facts bear out that the battle for Normandy, and therefore France, was as bloody as any during the whole War. Both Allied and Nazi divisions suffered a rough rate of 2,500 casualties per month, compared to 1,500 as an average on the Eastern front.

Beevor's text throws the reader directly into the action, with the dicey few days before invasion, when weather reports were indecisive. The main thrust of Overlord, which had been in planning ever since the US entered the War in late 1941, was to achieve total surprise with the Allied thrust landing in Normandy, rather than Pas-de-Calais, which the Germans and in particular Hitler had expected. Arguably the greatest military deception of all time was achieved, as German commanders still thought that the main Allied armies would land some time after D-Day had started. This is not Beevor's territory to cover, and to his credit he does not get sidetracked into describing this. The landings, which have caused so much controversy over the years, are covered quickly, as the Allies made quick headway initially.

It's in the heavy fighting afterwards that his skill as a historian cum storyteller rises to the occasion. After establishing a bridgehead, it was then necessary for the combined Allied divisions to break out and try to push the Germans back to the Seine. Facing them were the Wehrmacht, which was a mixture of crack SS Panzer formations, including the notorious Adolf Hitler Leibstandarte, Hitler Jugend and Das Reich divisions and in striking contrast, poorly equipped standard troops often made up of captured Polish soldiers forced to fight. They were under the command of Field Marshalls Rommel and Rundstedt, experienced soldiers who were aware that the invasion was imminent, and that the resources at their command, both in logistics and men were scarce.

By 1944 relations between US and British commanders had become strained. The Americans, frustrated by British reluctance to commit to a second front for so long, also disagreed that the indirect approach to fighting, propagated with such tireless campaigning by Winston Churchill, was the way forward. The British though were right to be cautious. They had suffered ignominy at the hands of the Wehrmacht in 1940, and it was clear that their troops and equipment were not up to standard. The Second Front would only be launched when it was perceived that the chances of victory were high. Leading the British troops was Montgomery, a soldier much loved by his men, but known to exasperate his superiors. The Americans were led by a combination of Omar Bradley and joining them later, the irascible Patton, who brought a confident swagger to proceedings.

With virtually utter air superiority, the Allies were able to roam the skies at will, yet one of the lesser known facts of the campaign is most of the main bomber operations were considerable failures. Montgomery used heavy bombing to flush out the Germans out of Caen, but this only succeeded in destroying the city and killing over 5,000 civilians. It is worth knowing that more French civilians died during the entire Normandy campaign (including the sustained bombing since January 1944) than British civilians during the entire War. Normandy was essentially sacrificed so that France could be saved.

And despite fighter-bombers such as the P-47 Thunderbolt and Hawker Typhoon proving to be the nemesis of Panzer crews, the Germans fought with exceptional skill and ferocity to bog down the Allies in the sylvan alleys of the Bocage. This network of impassable verdant greenry created a nightmarish labyrinth for the inexperienced Allied crews to negotiate, not helped either by the Wehrmacht's superior weaponry. The 88mm anti-tank gun was without doubt one of the most effective of the War, its range and destructive potential often able to pick up numerous Allied tanks without being engaged.

Speed and momentum are vital to mechanized warfare, and the countryside in Normany did little to help. Combined with the fanatical resistance of the SS divisions, and considerable experience in fighting in the Eastern front, the Germans, despite heavy losses inflicted so much damage that it was feared at one point that a breakout would not be achieved. What cost the Nazis defeat in France was the inability of Hitler to concede that a mobile defence was more effective. His strange decision to adhere to the Great War dictum of defence via fortresses seems all the more mysterious when one considers the achievements of Blitzkreig in 1940. It was only when the tigerish General Model arrived, having replaced the hapless Kluge, that German resistance stiffened. By then though, the Americans and British had broken the resolve of enemy troops that were worn down by relentless air attacks and a lack of equipment. By August, French soldiers entered Paris as the vanguard of a liberating force that would see the the great city relieved without much damage, thanks in part to General Von Choltitz, who ignored Hitler's command to raze the city to the ground.

Given the immensity of D-Day, and its impact as the Western Allies decisive event of the conflict, it is often easy to become bogged down in much of the other attributable events that happened within its sphere. The problems of a shared Command structure are enough for a series of books in itself (see Andrew Robert's Masters and Commanders which I will review soon) and to his credit Beevor manages to describe these without losing touch with the intensity of the experiences that the ordinary soldiers had. Unlike the Desert War, which was often called the "Gentlemans War" due to the fact that civilians were not involved and the terrain was to a certain aspect forgiving, the battle for Normandy was a ghastly, bloody affair. Inexperienced British and American troops suffered tremendously at the hands of fanatical SS troops, who would often fight to the last man. There is much to be said for the trouble in organising and motivating a conscription army from a Democracy against the tireless zealots of a Totalitarian state affected by propaganda, and it is to their credit that the US and British commanders were able to sustain a bloody battle and eventually force a hard-won victory that enabled France to be saved.

1939 - Countdown to War

Our ever-increasing trend of celebrating or remembering great events through countless anniversaries naturally tends to concentrate on one particular date. The start of the Second World War on September 1 with Germany's invasion of Poland is somewhat of a misnomer, being that if we were to consider the whole global conflict, then it could be argued that Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was the first aggressive blow in a protracted battle, and that Poland's fight was extinguished within a month. Given that the two main participants in the European theatre were allied during the Polish War, one could argue that the Second World War did not begin truly until Germany sought to knock out France in May the following year.

Overy's book, released to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the conflict, concentrates on the 7 crucial days before War broke out. It's a short, punchy affair that is written without too much resort to diplomatic historical notes, and instead paraphrases the thoughts of those involved at the highest levels alongside memories of everyday folk seeing and hearing their respective countries fall inevitably into a fight. We're given invaluable insights, like Hitler's irritability and Von Ribbentrop's malevolent arrogance to the German ambassador Sir Neville Henderson's patience with his counterparts in Berlin. The 7 days are broken down into segments, and at times it's not a inevitable decline, as the period from 27th to 31st August raises hopes of a reprieve. There's a slight feeling of unreality during the whole period, and pertinently, up on hearing of the French and British declaration of war, in Berlin William Shirer wrote of "astonishment, depression on the faces of the population. There were no demonstrations, no throwing of flowers, no war fever." At the British Embassy he was shocked by the insouciance of the staff as "they talked about dogs and stuff".

From the outset, much is given to the intractable nature of Poland's existence, given that she was reborn by the Versailles Treaty, and against the inevitability of German aggression towards her. Yet until March 1939 when the battle lines were drawn, the reality was that the two countries had little to fight about, and Poland had been keen to take advantage of Germany's aggression towards the prone Czechoslovakia. Behind all this though was Hitler, whose dreams of Lebensraum ultimately drove his country to War.

Much of this book provides the notion that it might have been possible for the War to be averted. Hitler did not want to fight the English in particular. He harboured no real ill-feeling towards them, and respected their global empire. This was born out by the half-hearted attempt to invade in 1940 with the aborted "Operation SeaLion", but he also thought that they were in no real position to fight, and indeed it was only in 1938 that British rearmanent had begun to flicker into life. However, he had also lost considerable face at Munich, and was not prepared to do so again when involved in this latest round of diplomatic brinkmanship. Overy's skill in the book is to pinpoint the date of August 25th, when he outlines Hitler's hesitation, which has not been outlined before. The Wehrmacht was ready to march, but at the last moment was called back from the brink, and the order to invade Poland delayed. Grim and irritable, Hitler was beginning to sense that he could not break the firm commitment by the English to stay firm to their resolve in protecting Poland. By the time the War came, he did not want to face another humiliating comedown in front of his Army, and in many respects, went through with ordering a War, consciously aware that he was creating a nemesis he could not defeat.

Neville Chamberlain, whom history has treated somewhat badly, naturally had a major role as the British PM. It is easy, when placed alongside the Warlord Churchill, for him to be seen as a fey, flimsy character especially given his myopia during the Munich crisis a year later. However, Overy feels that it was his resolve, shaken considerably by what had happened in March when the Germans rolled into Prague, that stirred the British to remain on track to help the Polish, even though in reality, they could not in any militaristic sense. His speech on the 3rd of September still resonates with the sound of a man wracked with the sense of personal failure in not stopping War.

There has been much discussion that the British and French decision to help Poland exacerbated a local conflict into a global one, but there is also much to be said of the Polish determination not to give ground in any way during this period, and that if they had done so, then it is possible that German aggression might have petered out. At the centre of arguments of this nature is the personality of Hitler, whose experiences in the First World War had told him of the explosive potential of surprise. This was his greatest weapon, and in the Rhineland, the Anschluss of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and in May 1940 was used with devastating impact. But here, in 1939, Hitler did not have it, and being unable to break the Anglo-French alliance, was dragged into a fight with opponents that he did not want. It was the dictum of a "War now, rather than later" that drove him. What he did have this time was luck. The Molotov-Ribentropp pact sealed a Soviet willingness to do a deal over a broken Poland, and despite France's apparent readiness to go to war, neither France or Britain made an effort to pressurize Germany on its undefended Western front.

Ultimately, the Polish campaign defined Hitler's War. Poland's army was considerable, and whilst outdated, still had much to commend it. Yet within a month, the Wehrmacht had smashed their opponents with a fearsome combination of motorized tank warfare and airpower that became known as Blitzkreig. The Polish Army was ill-judged with its strategy, not taking note of one of the essential points of warfare that "by defending everything you defend nothing" and was never in a position to make a reasonable defence, even more so when the Soviets marched in two weeks later. The experience and confidence the Wehrmacht gained from this campaign gave them the impetus to conceive of a possible attack on their Western Front, which would knock the French out of the conflict, and put the British in a desparately difficult position.

"Countdown to War" expertly manages to encapsulate the whirlwind diplomacy that took place during this time, hinting at the false dawn of avoidance of War, but as Malcolm Muggeridge put it on September 3, 1939 " Like a swimmer tired of battling with a contrary current, abandoning the struggle, and letting himself be carried along by what he had long tried to resist, this last crisis was left to take its course", the feeling throughout is that Germany had long set in motion a juggernaut that could not be stopped.